The Effects of Participatory Propaganda:From Socialization to Internalization of Conflicts by Asmolov, Grigori
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.21428/7808da6b.833c9940
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Asmolov, G. (2019). The Effects of Participatory Propaganda: From Socialization to Internalization of Conflicts.
Journal of Design and Science, (6), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.21428/7808da6b.833c9940
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
The Effects of Participatory Propaganda: From
Socialization to Internalization of Conflicts
Gregory Asmolov Lorrie LeJeune
Aug 07, 2019
DOI: 10.21428/7808da6b.833c9940
In this essay, Gregory Asmolov, a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s
College London and a scholar noted for his work understanding the Russian In-
ternet (Runet), examines a new set of propaganda strategies emerging on social
networks in Ukraine and Russia. He takes us on a conceptual journey from un-
derstanding how traditional propaganda has been “rewired” for the digital age to
examining its methodologies and impact today. This new phenomenon of ”partic-
ipatory propaganda” seeks not only to persuade users to interpret events through
a particular lens, but also to manipulate relationships, dividing friends, breaking
alliances and leaving individuals isolated and tractable, online and offline.
— Ethan Zuckerman, Editor
Propaganda is no longer just a tool for changing your opinion. Now,
in our digitally mediated world, propaganda is a pathway to instanta-
neous participation in political conflicts from the safety and comfort
of your living room chair. It is also, ironically, now a tool for instan-
taneously breaking connections between friends and relatives whose
opinions differ. Participatory propaganda helps to socialize conflicts
and make them part of everyday life. This increasing scope of engage-
ment can also lead to an internalization of conflict, which means that
instead of encouraging you to filter alternative sources of informa-
tion, participatory propaganda aims to reshape your cognitive filters
as well as the relationship between you and your environment.1
Introduction: Back in the USSR
It is October of 1986. I am one of 25 children in the pre-school group of a
kindergarten in the Leninsky district of Moscow. It is the “quiet hour” in the
middle of the day when children are supposed to nap, but I cannot sleep. I am
very worried. Every evening, after the “Spokoynoy Nochi, Malyshi” (Goodnight,
Kids) children’s show on television at 8:45 pm, I watch the evening news program
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“Vremya” (Time). Last evening I heard that our leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, is
going to meet the American leader, Ronald Reagan, in Reykjavík. I cannot
understand why Gorbachev is going there. I am sure the Americans are going
to kill him. I am also sleepless because I am afraid of nuclear war. At this time
“Star Wars” for me is not a movie, but a plan for American military aggression
against the people of the Soviet Union.
So my parents offered me a new game. They gave me an old radio and taught
me how to search for short-wave radio stations. Unlike our TV, which had
only six buttons for six channels, the radio offered a range of voices in different
languages. The purpose of the game was to scan the short waves and find
Russian-speaking stations broadcasting from beyond the borders of the USSR;
the so-called “Vrazheskie golosa” (Enemy Voices). It was quite tricky, since
the tiniest movements of my fingers would sweep past these stations, and their
wavelengths sometimes changed in order to avoid being jammed by the Soviet
government.
I learned very quickly how to recognize Radio Freedom, the Voice of Israel, the
Voice of America and the BBC. (Who could imagine that 30 years later I would
have an office in Bush House, where the BBC Russian Service was broadcasting
from at that time, and is now part of King’s College London!) I really enjoyed
my parents’ new game. For the first time in my life, I was actively involved
in searching for news. I also started to sleep better during the “quiet hour” at
kindergarten. Through that radio game I learned that the same events can be
described in very different ways. Although I wasn’t able to understand many
things, it highlighted the polyphony of voices and framings. I was lucky to have
this experience just then, in 1986. Only a year later, “glasnost,” a new policy
of media openness, began to influence Soviet TV, and the “enemy voices” lost
their unique value as a window onto an alternative reality.
The image of me as a child sitting in my bedroom in front of the radio and
searching for “enemy voices” comes back as I think about how the Internet has
changed propaganda. In 1986 that old short-wave radio was a physical mediator
between me as a user and the global environment. It brought new meanings
directly into my bedroom. I didn’t know that what I heard was called “anti-
Soviet propaganda.” Similarly, I hadn’t known that the news I watched on TV
was propaganda, either. What really mattered was the range of voices brought
to me by these various tools of mediation.
Today, with the Internet, it is much easier to find alternative sources. The
quality of information is often good, and there is no need for tiny movements of
the fingers, although instead of the Soviet-style “glushilki” (jammers), we have
new technologies like packet filtering and state-sponsored censorship. These
days, however, it seems that even a huge diversity of voices still does not help to
challenge propaganda or increase critical thinking. One could suggest that, in
order to address this puzzle, we need to focus not on the content of propaganda,
but on its delivery, and to ask how the new technological tools used for the
proliferation of propaganda change the relationship between users and their
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environment.
The Affordances of “Rewired Propaganda”: A
Mediational Perspective
The comparison between a television set picking up six broadcast channels and
a short-wave radio picking up hundreds highlights the difference between closed
and open artifacts mediating the relationship between subjects and their envi-
ronment. “Closed” artifacts transfer only limited streams of information, both
in terms of the number of channels and of the scope of sources that can be cov-
ered by those channels. “Open” artifacts offer a window onto a limitless world
of sources and an unrestricted number of channels. Propaganda has always
been more at home in an isolated environment, where it need not compete with
alternative sources and where it has a monopoly over shaping the perception of
the audience. Counter-propaganda, in its turn, has tried to break this monopoly
and find a way through the “curtain” of isolation, either by distributing printed
matter (for example, dropping leaflets from the air) or by using radio, whose
signal waves are notoriously unimpressed by national borders.
The emergence of the Internet, however, challenged the capacity of state actors
to isolate any environment from external information. Some countries, such
as North Korea and Turkmenistan, disconnected their local Internet from the
global infrastructure in order to maintain that isolation. Others introduced
advanced mode of filtering such as what we now know as the “Great Firewall
of China.” Russia chose a different path. From the outset, the Russian Inter-
net, also known as Runet, developed as an independent space. Its development
has been driven by imaginaries of alternative cultural, social, and political en-
vironments beyond the control of traditional political institutions (Asmolov &
Kolozaridi, 2017). “The online sphere challenges how the Russian state has
traditionally dominated the information heights via television” (Oates, 2016).
This, however, sparked a new type of propaganda that would be effective de-
spite the lack of state control over the information environment. This new type
of propaganda, described by Sarah Oates as “rewired propaganda,” seeks to
neutralize the Internet’s capacity to undermine authority and challenge the nar-
ratives of the state. In Oates’s formulation, “a commitment to disinformation
and manipulation, when coupled with the affordances of the new digital age,
gives particular advantages to a repressive regime that can pro-actively shape
the media narrative.”
Rewired propaganda uses some traditional tools of Internet control, like filtering
and censorship. But its novelty lies in its preference for more innovative models
of propaganda, including sophisticated manipulation of information and compu-
tational propaganda (Wooley & Howard, 2016; Sanovich, 2017). Computational
propaganda, in particular, relies on affordances that allow fake identities to be
created by mutually reinforcing human and non-human agents, including dis-
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information agents and bots. For example, a believable inauthentic voice is
created by an individual, then amplified by bots. These actors not only dis-
tribute content but also increase the visibility of information. They may also
change the structure of discourse and increase its emotional sentiment. Human
image synthesis technologies, which rely on AI and machine learning, provide
the means to fabricate evidence, including “deep fakes” where the line between
what appears to be genuine and what is not has been eliminated (Edwards, S.
& S. Livingston, 2018). Less sophisticated tools for content editing allow these
actors to create “shallow fakes” in which an image is recontextualized, or simply
misrepresented (Johnson, 2019).
Defining Propaganda
Before we go deeper into our discussion of propaganda, we must first define
what it is. One of the classical definitions of propaganda is “the management of
collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (Laswell, 1927).
A more detailed definition states that “Propaganda is the expression of opinions
or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influ-
encing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined
ends and through psychological manipulations” (the Institute for Propaganda
Analysis, 1937/1972). Yet another describes propaganda as “Communication
designed to manipulate a target population by affecting its beliefs, attitudes, or
preferences in order to obtain behaviour compliant with political goals of the pro-
pagandist” (Benkler et. al., 2018). One may also argue that propaganda often
incorporates the voice of the state and is driven by the interests of institutional
hegemonic actors.
Three elements are central to these definitions: Propaganda is intentional; it
relies on manipulation, specifically through the use of misleading information;
and its purpose is to support political goals by drawing out and managing be-
havior. The challenge, however, is to define what elements within propagandist
messaging are misleading or manipulative. Addressing these questions is partic-
ularly challenging in the context of conflicts. What is considered propaganda by
one side of the conflict would be treated by the other side as the legitimate “pre-
sentation of a case in such a way that others may be influenced” (Stuart, 1920)
and dissemination of information for a justified cause. It is considerably chal-
lenging to “coherently distinguish ‘propaganda’ from a variety of other terms
that refer to communication to a population that has a similar desired outcome:
persuasion, marketing, public relations, and education” (Benkler et al., 2018).
In order to address some of these challenges, I focus my attention in this essay on
one particular aspect of propaganda: its role in the mobilization of individuals
and groups. Gustave Le Bon in 1903 was among the first to consider propaganda
as a way to shape the opinions and beliefs of crowds in order to move those
crowds towards specific goals. By 1965 Jacques Ellul was also focused on the
link between propaganda and action, while considering propaganda “A set of
methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active
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or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals….” More specific
models for the interrelationship between propaganda and desired action had
already been mapped by George Bruntz (1938). For example, leaflets dropped
from the air onto enemy soldiers can be viewed as a “propaganda of despair”
intended to “break down the morale of the enemy,” and at the same time as
a “propaganda of hope” intended to present to the enemy army and civilians a
picture of a promised land they can enter if they will only lay down their arms.
Understanding propaganda as a way to drive a specific mode of action among a
target audience highlights the dual role of propaganda. On the one hand, it seeks
to shape a particular world view and offer a specific interpretation of something
happening in the environment surrounding the subject. On the other hand, by
relying on the symbolic dissemination of meanings, it also seeks to support or
provoke an action by this subject that will impact and potentially change the
environment in a specific way. This duality can be captured and conceptualized
if we approach propaganda from a mediational perspective (Kaptelinin, 2014),
in other words, as something that shapes the relationship between a subject and
their environment. Relying on that approach, I offer a definition of propaganda
that relies on a notion of mediation:
Propaganda is an intentional effort to shape the relationship between
an individual target of information (the subject) and their environ-
ment (the object) by relying on the dissemination of symbolic mean-
ing in order to support a particular course of the subject’s activity
in relation to specific objects of activity.
In a nutshell, digital propaganda changes the relationship between users (sub-
jects) and conflict (objects of users’ activity in their environment).
The relationship between subject and object has two directions. The first direc-
tion, from the world towards the subject, relies on the mediation of meaning.
The second direction, from the subject towards the world, relies on the me-
diation of activity. Propaganda aims either to support or change an existing
relationship to an object, or to construct a new object that requires the sub-
ject’s activity. The intentional construction of subject-object relationships may
rely on manipulative psychological techniques, as well as on the dissemination
of disinformation. The mediational perspective suggests that the discussion of
digital affordances should focus on how new digital means of production and
the proliferation of propaganda change the relationship between a subject and
their environment. The relationship between digital users in conflicts is an ex-
ample of the subject-object relationship. In that case, the mediation perspective
explores not only how propaganda offers new frames and interpretations of dif-
ferent conflict-related events, but also illustrates the range of activities that is
offered to users relying on digital tools in conflict situations.
I’ll note, however, that propaganda does not necessarily aim to construct an
active relationship between subject and object. As pointed out by Ellul, one
mode of activity is passivity, which is sometimes the mode that the propagan-
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dist desires. This often happens in cases where propaganda seeks to induce
disorientation, a situation “in which the target population simply loses the abil-
ity to tell truth from falsehood or where to go for help in distinguishing between
the two” (Benkler et al., 2018).
To sum up, propaganda is not only a way to change a person’s perception of
the environment via symbolic means, but also a way to change the behavior
of a target audience in order to change the environment. In this sense, medi-
ation always acts in two directions: One, it aims to change the perceptions of
the recipient/ target audience (a group of subjects). Two, it aims to shape the
activity of the target audience in relation to the environment (or lack of action,
should the activity need to be neutralized). In the past, these two processes
were distinguishable from each other. First, a subject received a message via an
artifact, either in public spaces (e.g. posters, cinema, newsstands or loudspeak-
ers) or in private spaces (TV or radio receivers). The subject then chose to act
in accordance with the message they received.
Digital affordances have now changed the structure of relationships between
messaging that tinkers with the subject’s perception of the environment and
the subject’s activity in relation to that environment. Digital platforms allow
Internet users to not only consume information, but to also choose from a broad
range of potential follow-on activities in relation to the objects whose percep-
tion is shaped by propaganda. In order to understand the effects of “rewired
propaganda,” we need to look specifically at how the design of our digital infor-
mation environment allows for new kinds of links between how subjects receive
information and their activity after they receive it.
The Participatory Affordances of Propaganda
Over the last century, propaganda has gradually moved from open squares and
public places to our homes. This process can be associated with the domesti-
cation of technologies, where the device that mediates meanings, particularly
the TV, has continuously occupied domestic spaces (Silverstone, 1994). The
boundaries of spaces in which we consume media have expanded further with
the rise of mobile technologies including laptops and handheld devices. Maren
Hartmann (2013) describes this trend as a shift from domestication to “mediated
mobilism.”
As a consequence, propaganda infiltrates our most intimate spaces, where users
interact with their laptops and mobile devices. The location of technological in-
teraction is not simply the household, but the bed or sofa — spaces commonly
associated with relaxation and entertainment. Propaganda moves from the liv-
ing room to the bedroom, follows people as they travel to work on crowded
public transport, and remains with them in office time. We can wake up and
fall asleep with propaganda in our hands. It finds us at the university, in the
bathroom or on the beach.
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Propaganda is also reshaped by the design of the spaces in which content is
encountered and shared. Traditional media relied on physical artifacts such as
newspapers or TV, so content consumption was mostly a solitary activity rather
than a social one. Even when news consumption happened in a public place, for
example, people listening to the radio outside in the square or friends or family
watching TV news together, the media space and the social interaction space
were separate. In contrast, the interactive nature of digital media removes the
gap between the space where content is generated and distributed and the space
where content is consumed and discussed. Social networking platforms combine
news consumption with social interaction, turning social interaction into a mech-
anism of content proliferation and selective amplification (Zuckerman, 2018).
The integration of content generation/sharing and content discussion creates
an immersive effect whereby users are unable to separate content consumption
(and its impact on their lives) from their personal communication. In online
environments, the consumption of propaganda is deeply embedded in the struc-
ture of social relations, which allows the propaganda to further infiltrate our
everyday lives. More important are the ways social media and the spread of on-
line content create opportunities for immediate action: spreading propaganda
further, or taking other actions directly suggested by the propaganda.
Propaganda has often been linked to a desired mode of action, such as surrender
or contributing one’s resources to a specific cause. Historically, however, the
means of propaganda distribution and the means of action were separate and
distinct. The target (or subject) of propaganda was first exposed to a message
(via leaflet, poster, newspaper article, or broadcast message), which they sub-
sequently acted upon. Due to the participatory nature of digital technologies,
propaganda distribution, consumption, and participation often share the same
platform and are mediated by the same digital devices (such as mobile phones
or laptops). The person exposed to propaganda is also offered a selection of
actions to carry out (often instantly) in the same virtual environment.
The consequences of these new participatory affordances are particularly visible
in the context of conflicts. In his book iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the
Interactive Era, Mark Andrejevic points out that “in a disturbing twist to the
interactive promise of the Internet, once-passive spectators are urged to become
active participants.” In this way, Andrejovic says, Internet users become citizen-
soldiers when “we are invited to participate in the war on terrorism from the
privacy of our homes and from our offices, or wherever we might happen to be.”
David Patrikarakos analyzes a number of cases of digitally mediated citizen
involvement in war and comes to the same conclusion: “In the world of Homo
Digitalis, anyone with an Internet connection can become an actor in a war”
(Patrikarakos, 2017).
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Social Media and Propaganda
At least three novel aspects in the relationship between social media and propa-
ganda are worth considering:
1. Digitally mediated participation in the creation and proliferation of pro-
paganda and various online content-related activities, including various
forms of engagement with content (from commenting to complaining).
2. Digitally mediated participation in online and offline action triggered by
propaganda, beyond content-related activities and relying on various forms
of crowdsourcing.
3. The action of disconnection, using digital means to effect the immediate
cutting of social ties, including unfollowing, unfriending or blocking.
The participatory nature of propaganda, particularly where propaganda is linked
to a call to take part in propaganda efforts, has been well-documented. “Peer-to-
peer propaganda” is a situation where “Ordinary people experience the propa-
ganda posts as something shared by their own trusted friends, perhaps with com-
ments or angry reactions, shaping their own opinions and assumptions” (Haigh
et al., 2017). The same researchers argue that “States can rely on citizens’ do-
it-yourself disinformation campaigns to maintain the status quo.” Mejias and
Vokuev (2017) point out that “…social media can also give ordinary citizens
the power to generate false and inaccurate information,” while “propaganda is
co-produced by regimes and citizens.” Finally, Khaldarova and Pantti (2016)
explore participatory verification of data, where an online initiative such as the
StopFake platform “mobilizes ordinary Internet users to engage in detecting and
revealing fabricated stories and images on the Ukraine crisis” and address this
as “Crowdsourced Information Warfare.”
It is important to differentiate between open and transparent calls to participate
in the generation, proliferation, and verification of content in order to support
your state, and various forms of clandestine or camouflaged online manipulation
designed to trigger user participation. An illustration of an open call can be seen
in the case of the Ukrainian I-army project launched by the Ukrainian Ministry
of Information:
“In one year, we created a powerful army that defends us in the
Donbas area. Now, it’s time to resist Russian invaders on the infor-
mation front. Every Ukrainian who has access to the Internet can
contribute to the struggle. Every message is a bullet in the enemy’s
mind.”
A similar type of initiative could be seen on the Russian side. A website, “Inter-
net Militia” called on Internet users to take part in defense of the Motherland:
“Even in five minutes you can do a lot. “Internet Militia” — this is
a news feed, where links are accompanied by suggestions for direct
action. For example, follow the link and leave a comment. What
8
could be easier? Today it is important the participation of everyone
who loves his Motherland.”
In many cases, however, user participation is driven not by open, direct calls,
but by various forms of psychological manipulation. We can see forms of propa-
ganda that support user engagement via the sharing of the emotional, imaginary
and so-called “fake news” and through the activity of state-sponsored trolls and
computational propaganda. We can also differentiate between volunteer and
paid forms of users participation. These paid forms of participation (as in the
case of the Chinese 50 cents party) limit the scope of participants and usually
operate in secret. In other cases, user generated propaganda transforms from
crowd participation to targeted engagement of selected users who develop spe-
cific skills, as in the case of the Russian troll factory in Ol’gino where “More than
1,000 paid bloggers and commenters reportedly worked only in a single building
at Savushkina Street in 2015.” This illustrates the shift from crowdsourcing to
outsourcing of propaganda.
Crowdsourcing Conflict
The notion of crowdsourcing is particularly useful when analyzing participatory
propaganda, as mobile devices are not only good tools for recirculating con-
tent, but also for mobilizing resources. When combined with crowdsourcing,
propaganda offers a double effect. It not only builds awareness of the propa-
ganda messaging, but also allows users to respond to propaganda issues at the
same time and through the same channel. The range of user resources that can
be mobilized by relying on digital mediation of propaganda is astounding and
includes: sensor resources (for data collection); analytical resources (for data
classification); intellectual resources (to build knowledge and skills); social re-
sources (to engage more people around a specific goal); financial resources (also
known as crowdfunding), and physical resources. Crowdsourcing also allows us
to highlight how propaganda creates an emotional condition in the user, which
in turn supports the mobilization of resources and reshapes the user’s priorities
for future resource allocation.
Content-related activities, such as sharing, liking, commenting and complaining,
can also be viewed as a form of crowdsourcing since the generation and prolifer-
ation of content also relies on the mobilization of user activity. Crowdsourcing
as a concept is particularly helpful in showing how propaganda-driven digitally
mediated activity goes beyond the usual content-related actions that take place
online. The Russia-Georgia and Russia-Ukraine conflicts illustrate the range of
potential activities in this context (Deibert et al., 2012; Hunter, 2018). This
includes data-gathering for intelligence purposes, diverse forms of open-source
intelligence analysis (OSINT), various forms of hacktivism, logistical support
for different sides of a conflict, including the purchasing of military equipment
through crowdfunding, and various forms of offline volunteering.
Some forms of participation are afforded by increasing the role of big data. For
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example, modern conflicts take place in an environment where all sides of the
conflict as well as the local population in the areas of conflict generate conflict-
related data. These data create new opportunities for gathering valuable intelli-
gence, both for informational as well as ground warfare. In that way, users have
an opportunity to participate in data generation, collection, and analysis. Some
users develop skills for open source intelligence and create online data analytics
communities. Examples include groups like the Ukrainian Inform-Napalm, Rus-
sian Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) and UK-based Bellingcat (Toler, 2018).
Members of communities also teach others how to analyze conflict-related data.
These community groups played a major role in confirming the presence of Rus-
sian soldiers in Ukraine, despite denials by Russian leaders, exposing the scale
of casualties among Russian soldiers, as well as investigating the downing of
Malaysia Airlines flight 17.
Some Russian conflict related data are not available in open sources, but are
still obtained by hackers from both sides of the conflict. Various forms of hacker
activities include accessing restricted data or attacking websites that are consid-
ered enemy targets. Most aspects of hacktivism require some degree of advanced
skills, though a broad range of Internet users can carry out hacking-related tasks
using standard computing resources and tools that simplify participation. Mem-
bers of “the crowd” successfully helped analyze hacker-obtained email and other
types of internal communication by the rival side of the Russian conflict. That
analysis fed into propaganda and counter propaganda efforts by both sides of
the conflict, while also providing valuable intelligence.
Various crowdfunding initiatives sprang up on both sides of the conflict, and
relied on social networks and blogs as well as dedicated websites. These crowd-
funding efforts supported both traditional military units (particularly on the
Ukrainian side) as well as volunteer units, with most of the funds collected be-
ing used to purchase military equipment and ammunition. Other crowdfunding
efforts enabled offline engagement of Internet users. For example, by using the
funds to purchase drones, some Ukrainian users were able to self-organize and
establish volunteer groups for air reconnaissance (drone-based surveillance) in
order to gather real-time intelligence.
Digital platforms also played a major role in engagement and coordination of
various types of warfare-related offline activities. A variety of Ukrainian groups
relied on social networks, messengers, and crowdsourcing platforms to coor-
dinate logistical support for volunteer battalions and military units. On the
Russian side, dedicated Vkontakte groups as well as the website Dobrovolec.org
(volunteers) helped coordinate opportunities for volunteers to join pro-Russian
paramilitary units in the eastern Ukraine. And social media on both sides of the
conflict allowed users to provide humanitarian assistance to people displaced by
conflict.
These examples of digitally-mediated user resource mobilization illustrate the
increasing scope of users’ participation in conflict. These forms of participation
were shaped by the perception of the conflict as it was communicated via digital
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media on both the Russian and Ukraine side. I’ll also note that the scope of
participation on the Ukrainian side was broader due to a shared understanding
that the state is under threat of Russian aggression, and because of the lim-
ited capabilities of the Ukrainian traditional military to provide an adequate
response during the initial phases of conflict. To some extent, Ukrainian users
formed a digitally mediated ecosystem of participation where various forms of
conflict-related activity supported one another.
The Ukrainian case demonstrates that digital platforms were effective in sup-
porting users’ participation in conflict, not only due to the connection between
the calls to action and the affordance of participation, but also because digital
networks exposed the inability of traditional institutions to offer an adequate
response to such an external threat. Therefore, one may argue that users’ par-
ticipation was driven not only by the state’s propaganda but also by narratives
related to the absence of state. One may also argue that propaganda as a
strategy to shape the relationship between people and conflict aims not only
to support people’s engagement, but also to control the scope of participation.
On the Russian side of the conflict, the scope of users’ participation was mostly
limited to online content-related activities (such as commenting, liking, sharing,
etc.) and crowdfunding, while on the Ukrainian side, the scope of participation
was substantially broader and went beyond the state’s control.
While participatory propaganda and crowdsourced participation leverage the
non-geographic nature of digital content to place production and action in the
same channel — a channel that pervades all physical and social spaces in human
life — they are not the truly disruptive faces of this phenomenon. More disturb-
ing is propaganda that seeks disconnection. Bruntz (1938) argued that one type
of propaganda is “particularist propaganda” that seeks to divide the members
of a target audience. Christopher Wiley, a whistleblower who revealed informa-
tion about Cambridge Analytica’s operations, points out that disconnection is
one of the main elements of the Breitbart doctrine that was shaped by Steve
Bannon. Wiley says, “If you want to fundamentally change society, you first
have to break it. And it’s only when you break it is when you can remold the
pieces into your vision of a new society.” (Source: the documentary “The Great
Hack”).
Digital Disconnection
Disconnection shapes the boundaries of social networks and consequently their
social structure. It is easy to forget that before the digital age, disconnection
from a friend required either face-to-face action, such as a refusal to shake
hands, or time-consuming mediated action such as sending a letter. Online
social networking sites (SNSs) offer not only easier ways to make friends, but
also easier ways to unmake them. The affordance of disconnection depends on
the particular design of a social networking site. For example, on Twitter a user
can be unfollowed, muted, blocked and/or reported. On Facebook, one of the
most common acts of disconnection is unfriending.
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It is very easy to cut social ties online, as most of us know by now. And, like
other types of digitally mediated activities, the disconnection takes place in the
same domain as the messages are distributed. Because of this, when political
messages including propaganda are pushed out, they can be followed by an
immediate act of disconnection, particularly since other users take an active
role in the generation and proliferation of the content. So propaganda can not
only influence users’ perception of a situation and trigger activity around it,
but it also shapes how we perceive other users within the situation. When we
receive propaganda via social networks, we are forced to decide whether the
sender should remain part of our social network.
Facebook’s design offers a fruitful environment for disconnection since it en-
ables the “sharing [of] the same conversations with highly different audiences”
(Schwarz and Shani, 2016). And because people are exposed to the political opin-
ions of their Facebook friends, as well as other bits of information they may not
have been privy to otherwise, propaganda becomes an effective tool for discon-
nection and polarization. Nicholas John and Shira Dvir-Gvirsman (2015) argue
that Facebook unfriending can be considered “a mechanism of disconnectivity
that contributes to the formation of homogeneous networks.” The constant pro-
duction of categories used to divide social groups into “us” and “them” as well
as disconnection between members of these groups can be viewed as a longterm
impact of propaganda. That is, the impact of messages can be seen in changes
to social structure and goes beyond the specific context of the situation that
triggers unfriending. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, considerable
evidence suggests that the conflict had a robustly destructive impact on strong
ties, including those between relatives, close friends and classmates. It mainly
affected relationships that had been developed long before the conflict (Asmolov,
2018).
The type of social relationship most affected by disconnective practice was be-
tween former classmates. Many platforms and groups support relationships
between classmates, including Facebook and a social network called Odnoklass-
niki (classmates) that is popular among users aged 40 and over. Through these
platforms, many people who shared the same school room dozens of years ago
found themselves on different sides of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. One Face-
book user reported that she unfriended two of her classmates because of their
position on the situation in Crimea. Another user from Ukraine described on
Facebook an experience of chatting with classmates from Russia on WhatsApp.
When his classmates discovered that he lives in Ukraine, they began discussing
the conflict and eventually tried to ban him from the chat. A Ukrainian user,
Irina Anilovksaya, published a book in 2014 describing the experience of conflict-
driven disconnection between people who were once close friends. In the book,
Irina describes a two-day exchange of online messages between herself and her
classmate Alexander, who lives in Russia. The story begins with a friendly dis-
cussion of the events and ends when Alexander and Irina accuse each other of
being “zombies” and “people who are afraid of the truth.” They say a mutual
farewell forever.
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The Effects of Participatory Propaganda
What do these new digital affordances actually do to us as individuals? And
what are the effects of participatory propaganda on our individual and collective
psyches? Propaganda that relies on the participatory design of digital networks
is best explained by looking at the link between two interrelated processes: the
socialization of political conflicts and the internalization of political conflicts.
The notion of “conflict socialization” was introduced by E. E. Schattschneider
(1975), who argues that “the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of
its contagion,” while “the number of people involved in any conflict determines
what happens.... every increase or reduction in the number of participants,
affects the result.” The notion of the scope of contagion highlights the role of the
crowd in the context of political conflicts. Schattschneider notes that, “Nothing
attracts a crowd as quickly as a fight. Nothing is so contagious.” Schattschneider
and others (Coser, 1956) also highlighted many years ago how political actors
can control and manipulate a conflict for their own purposes.
Today the digital public sphere offers a new set of tools for the manipulation and
control of citizen engagement in conflicts. The socialization of conflict is now
driven by the content proliferated through social networks, as well as through the
digital affordances of online platforms that offer a range of responses to conflict.
The role of content in the socialization of conflicts relies on the distinctive nature
of social networking platforms that combine the consumption of news with social
interaction, and makes social interaction a mechanism of content proliferation.
New information technologies — social networks and crowdsourcing practices
— also enable the geographically unrestricted “socialization of conflict.” They
provide an option not only of “watching together” but also of “acting together.”
In other words, users can participate in a conflict a continent away without ever
leaving the safety and comfort of their bedrooms.
As a result, one may argue that propaganda has become less interested in chang-
ing people’s opinion about a specific object or in convincing people that it is
either truth or fiction. The main purpose of 21st century propaganda is to in-
crease the scope of participation in relation to the object of propaganda. In a
digital environment relying on user participation, propaganda is a technology
of power that drives the socialization of conflicts and a tool for increasing the
scope of contagion. While participation in political debates is often considered
to be an important feature of democracy, propaganda allows us to define the
structure and form of participation in a way that serves only those who generate
propaganda, and minimizing the constructive outcomes of participation. In ad-
dition, the focus on propaganda as a driver of participation could be considered
a meeting point between political and commercial interests, since increasing en-
gagement with a given object of content is a path towards more pageviews and
more surrender of personal data. In that sense, propaganda serves not only the
political actors, but also the platform owners.
Increased participation in political conflicts also has effects on both the individ-
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ual and the collective psyche. This is highlighted by the notion of internaliza-
tion, developed originally as part of developmental psychology (Vygotsky, 1978).
“Internalization of mediated external processes results in mediated internal pro-
cesses. Externally mediated functions become internally mediated” (Kaptelinin
and Nardi, 2006). Through internalization, external cultural artifacts are in-
tegrated into the cognitive process and help to define our human relationship
with reality. For example, using maps gradually transforms the way we think
about our environment and how we navigate it. In other cases, “likes” and emo-
jis have been internalized and have become ingrained in our attitude toward a
specific object when we think about it. The way we see things translates into
our activities in relation to our environment, but the reverse is also true: Our
relationship with our environment is shaped by participatory affordances and
by the design of digital networks. In that way, digitally mediated participation
in conflict is linked to the development of cognitive filters that shape the way
we perceive social reality.
The role of internalization can be seen in the ways in which we think about
conflicts and how we consider various objects in the context of a conflict. This
suggests that participatory technologies that offer a broad range of ways to par-
ticipate in conflict both increase socialization of conflict (meaning an increase
in the scope of participation), but also create a psychological change in users.
The latter process is conceptualized here as the internalization of conflict. This
internalization means that the participatory design of social networks shapes
not only our views on a specific issue, but our perception of our environment
in general. Aleksandr Shkurko tells us that “social cognition is fundamentally
categorical” (2014). According to Shkurko, “we perceive others and regulate
our behaviour according to how we position ourselves and others in the social
world by ascribing them to a particular social label.” In that light, internaliza-
tion means that digitally-native propaganda is able to shape the structure of
categorization.
As a result, digital participatory propaganda shapes our relationship with our
environment beyond any specific topic (object); it changes the apparatus of
cognitive optics that structures our perception of everyday life. A conflict
encountered through digital propaganda becomes a point of reference for the
classification of a broad spectrum of events and social interactions. It shapes
interpretative frameworks in a variety of situations that are not related directly
to the conflict.
Nobel Laureate Joseph Brodsky noted that humanistic classification of others
should rely not on abstract categories of a person’s nationality, culture, religion
or political beliefs, but primarily on very specific categories that are related to
their deeds; i.e. if they are greedy or not, kind or not, coward or not. Conflict-
driven social classification diminishes the role of individual deeds in shaping
the structure of social relations and allows the institutional actors and state-
sponsored media to impose a dominant structure of classification. For example,
friends, relatives, former classmates, and co-workers started to be judged based
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not on previous interactions, common experiences, their professionalism or their
values, but based on their positions in regard to conflict. The activities of
everyday life, whether related to work or just a common experience on the
street, as well as personal frustrations and joys, are examined through the lens
of a conflict. A birthday party or family meeting turns into a discussion of
conflict, which either concludes satisfactorily because everyone agrees about the
conflict, or transforms into an unpleasant and even hostile encounter if one or
more individuals disagrees.
One outcome of internalization is the destruction of social ties between friends
by means of disconnection. It is not so much that the shape of social categories
shifts, but that certain categories become increasingly significant when it comes
to classification of everyday life events and social relationships. Individuals
begin to view everything through a conflict-oriented cognitive filter, including
issues not at all related to the conflict. Internalizing the conflict — allowing it to
reshuffle the relevance of one’s social categories — supports the socialization of
the conflict, through recirculating propaganda and mobilizing resources towards
crowdsourced warfare projects. In that way, the internalization and socialization
of conflict mutually support and reinforce each other.
Figure 1 illustrates how these processes are interrelated. Digital platforms medi-
ate a relationship between a user in Russia or Ukraine (subject of propaganda)
and the various aspects related to perception of the conflict (object of propa-
ganda), e.g. the Russian annexation of Crimea. The tools that mediate these
relationships offer the user a broad range of conflict-related forms of participa-
tion, from proliferation of conflict-related content to crowdfunding, hacktivism,
and online volunteering. This is conflict socialization. In contrast, the partic-
ipation of a user also contributes to an increase in the prominence of conflict
in the user’s everyday life and specifically the way conflict-related judgments
shape the users’ perception of their social circles and the environment beyond
the conflict. The outcome, as we discussed earlier, is that former classmates,
friends, and relatives begin to identify primarily with their position vis à vis the
conflict. The categories of that position are imposed by propaganda embedded
in the news feeds of social networks, and whose effect is multiplied by comment-
ing, sharing, and generating additional propaganda-related content. Those who
have an opposite opinion about the topics are excluded from social circles. This
is an outcome of conflict internalization.
Internalization explains the most insidious aspect of digital propaganda: the
transformation in users’ cognitive structure that manifests as a shift in their
classification structure. This shift, usually to binary thinking — in seeing the
world in terms of either you support the Russian statement “Crimea is ours” or
oppose it — affects all spheres of the user’s social relations and perceptions of
the world far beyond the specific topic of propaganda. The collective and the
individual psyche are interrelated. One may suggest that the more propaganda
has been socialized, the more it is internalized by the subject and reproduced
within the subject. Digitally mediated participation in propaganda-related ac-
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Figure 1: ¶ Figure 1: The mechanism of digitally mediated participatory
propaganda
tivities makes propaganda a part of our “inner space” and allows it to define
our perception of reality from within.
Conclusion: Beyond the USSR
Back in the USSR, propaganda sought to ensure that the state controlled the
way its citizens perceived reality and mobilized their resources. This control was
achieved by relying on a monopoly over informational sources. The purpose of
Western “counter-propaganda” was to break the walls of informational isolation.
The radio that I used as a child to search for “enemy voices” was actually my
Internet — an opportunity to look for information in an open environment
beyond the walls.
More than 30 years later we live in a significantly different information environ-
ment. Thanks to the proliferation of the Internet, states like Russia are not able
to control the information environment by limiting the range of sources. De-
spite infrastructural support and major financial investment, state-sponsored
TV channels have become less popular than YouTube (Ostrovsky, 2019). In
addition, thanks to social networks and messenger services, personal communi-
cation relies on horizontal networks and is not limited by any physical borders.
In the “space of flows,” as conceptualized by Manuel Castells (1999), informa-
tion technologies challenge the state’s sovereignty not only over its territory but
also, and significantly, over its citizens. In the multicultural and global informa-
tion environment, state actors have no effective tools that allow total isolation
of their citizens from a broad range of sources (with the exception of North Ko-
rea and Turkmenistan). Complete control over the information space through
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filtering and blocking is very hard to achieve.
The threat that comes from new information technologies was identified by some
states at very early stages. The first document signed by Russian President
Vladimir Putin in 2000 was the Information Security Doctrine, which addressed
new information technologies as a potential threat to political and social stability.
Concern over the loss of control in the new media environment is manifest in
the way the Russian authorities try to regulate the Internet. The concept of
a “sovereign Internet” seeks to equalize the scale of control over cyberspace
with the scale of control over offline space. But it seems that most traditional
approaches to re-creating various forms of isolation, at least within the Runet,
are failing.
The need to compensate for the loss of control over the media environment and
social interactions between people has required new approaches. These seek not
to restrict new information technologies, but to build on new digital affordances,
which allow us to offer a direct link between propaganda and the mobilization
of the resources of digital crowds. New forms of propaganda harness the par-
ticipatory design of social networks, crowdsourcing and the affordances of dis-
connectivity. They flourish in an environment where news cannot be separated
from interpersonal communication.
The purpose of the new propaganda is neither the production of reality nor
of unreality. The new propaganda seeks to offer a new way of restoring the
state’s sovereignty over people in the new information environment and to re-
build walls that have been demolished by global horizontal networks of com-
munication. It aims to mitigate the capacity of these networks to challenge the
state’s sovereignty. If the state is not able to control the flow of information and
communication, it targets the way this information is interpreted and analyzed.
Conflict-based cognitive filters ensure that horizontal networks and uncontrolled
flows of information do not threaten a state’s control over its citizens, as well
as expand the control of a state’s actors over individuals beyond its borders.
I’ll note that this essay doesn’t present an argument against digitally mediated
participation in conflict. People retain the right to disconnect online as well
as offline from people they don’t agree with. The question addressed here,
however, is if and how these participatory and disconnective affordances can
be harnessed by state actors relying on propaganda in order to achieve their
political goals. One may argue, for instance, that a massive digitally mediated
participation of users in the Ukrainian conflict was essential in order to protect
their country from a potential security threat. It’s not my purpose to draw a line
at what type of participation is genuine, and what type of participation can be
considered as an outcome of political manipulation. I might argue, however, that
participation that is driven by non-genuine actors and information from non-
transparent sources, participation that relies on fakes, and participation that
harnesses emotions is likely to be considered part of participatory propaganda.
The analysis of disconnective action should also focus on whether that type of
action was driven by manipulative efforts of institutional actors, shaping our
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relation with the environment. In that light, I argue that it is essential to
understand the political goals of participatory propaganda.
Participatory propaganda restores state sovereignty from within. It aims to
build walls in the inner spaces of the subject by shaping categories of percep-
tion of the environment. First, it constructs the object of a conflict that can
potentially divide people. Second, relying on the design of social networks that
combine information proliferation with personal interaction as well as the medi-
ated mobility of devices, it makes this conflict an omnipresent and integral part
of everyday life. Third, it offers a range of simple and immediate opportunities
for participation in conflict-related activity. Fourth, it increases the importance
of conflict in shaping the structure of people’s social categorizations. Finally, it
relies on the affordance of disconnectivity to mitigate the capacity of horizontal
networks to cross borders and challenge a state’s sovereignty.
What does this sort of propaganda do to us as a society? It is designed to imple-
ment new forms of sovereignty. It is designed to replace networked structures
of society with fragmentation and polarization. It helps to pull people apart
by forcing them into the role of combatants rather than citizens. It is designed
to destroy horizontal relationships that offer alternative sources of information
and that can potentially be transformed into independent collective action and a
broad opposition to institutional actors. It is designed to divide and rule. It pro-
duces a reality with new walls and borders that can sever personal relationships
and weaken critical thinking capabilities.
Participatory digital propaganda enables the private, everyday identity of users
to be occupied and taken over by the institutional actors that propagate it. Ad-
dressing these effects of propaganda requires that we lessen the significance of
conflict-related categorization for the interpretation of everyday life and offer
alternative forms of subject-object and subject-subject relationships that are
not driven by conflict. The protection of identity in a conflict-prone digital
environment may rely on the user’s capacity to control the scale of their engage-
ment in the conflict and may mitigate the role of conflict-related classification
in the interpretation of social relations and everyday life. It also requires that
counter-propaganda offer not an alternative view of specific events, but alterna-
tive classification structures that protect the autonomy of the subject, horizontal
networks, and independent forms of collaboration.
In 2014 and 2015, something strange happened in a place apparently quite far
from any conflict: the Russian-speaking segment of Tinder. One could see that
an increasing number of users wrote as a part of their personal description either
“Crimea ours” or “Crimea not ours.” The relationship with a conflict became
not only a signifier for evaluating existing relationships, but also a driver for
forming new romantic relationships and friendships. The Crimea conflict found
its way into one of the most intimate aspects of life. I argue that the way to
counter propaganda is not to convince others whose Crimea it is, but to weaken
the role of propaganda in shaping our relations and follow Brodsky’s vision of
humanistic social classification. That means we judge and love one another not
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on the basis of political categories that are created to divide us, but on our
everyday deeds and actions.
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